Legal Notes by Editors,
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
LEGAL NOTES.-
THE recent cases of Hanleyv.Donogiue, 116 U. S. S. C., 1, and Renaud
v. Abbott, Id. 277, while not passing upon the question, serve to recall
the diversity of opinion, evidenced by the decisions of the various state
courts, in regard to whether a judgment rendered jointly against two
defendants, one only of whom is summoned, and which is allowed to
remain unappealed from, is void as against the summoned defendant.
This subject was so recently considered in an article by Mr. Frederick
J. Brown. of Baltimore, published in Am. Law Reg. (N. S.), vol. xix.,
p. 673, that we desire simply to call attention to the elaborate and
careful note since written by Mr. A. 0. Freeman to St. John v. Holmes,
32 Am. Dec. 604, in which he reviews the cases and examines the
ground of the decisions. His conclusions, which agree with those pre-
viously reached by Mr. Brown, are thus emphatically expressed: "The
authorities show that the courts of Massachusetts, Maine and New
Hampshire are fully, and, perhaps, unalterably committed to the doc-
trine that a judgment is an entirety, and if void against one of the
defendants is void as to all. * * * We believe it to be without any
other support than the authority of those eminent courts, which,
through what we conceive to be either a misapprehension of a prior
decision, or of the real nature of the question in issue, pronounced in
its favor. We say misapprehension of the question in issue, because
the courts seemed to treat it as a mere question of error and not of
power, and to assume that if error was shown the judgment was void."
This is significant, not only on account of Mr. Freeman's authority to
speak on such a question, but because the learned author, in sect. 136,
of his work on Judgments, had previously endorsed the contrary view.
ABSTRACTS OF REC'ENT DECISIONS.
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES. 1
SUPREME COURT OF FLORIDA.
2
COURT OF ERRORS AND APPEALS OF MARYLAND
SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA. 4
SUPREME COURT OF RHODE ISLAND.
5
AGENT.
Contract to Sell Land as Agent for Feme Covert-Real Ownershtip
of Agent-Fraudulent Conveyance to Principal.-A contract to sell a
1 Prepared expressly for the American Law Register, from the original opinions
filed during Oct. Term, 1885. The cases will probably appear in 117 U. S. Rep.
2 From D. C. Wilson, Esq., Clerk. The cases will probably appear in 21 or 22
Florida Rep.
3 From J. Shaaf Stockett, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 64 Md. Rep.
I From Hon. Theo. T. Davidson, Reporter; to appear in 94 N. C. Rep.
5 From Arnold Green, Esq., Reporter; to appear in 15 R. I. Rep.
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tract of land, purporting to belong to a feme covert, was made by one
who acted as her agent: It was held, that the contract was not binding
on the feme, 1st, because of her coverture, and 2d, because the agent
was not authorized by an instrument under seal to make the contract.
Such contract is not binding on the agent, because its terms do not pur-
port to bind him: Boyd v. Turpin, 94 N. V.
A son conveyed his land to his mother, afeme covert, for the purpose
of defrauding his creditors, and afterwards contracted in her name and
as her agent to sell the land to a bonO fide purchaser. After a portion
of the purchase-money had been paid, the mother attempted to repudi-
ate the contract, and brought an action to recover the possession of the
land: Held, that sh cannot be permitted to hold the land for which she
paid nothing, and at the same time disown the authority of the agent
who assumed to act for her. She must either surrender the land to him,
or abide by his disposition of it. The disability of coverture carries
with it no license to practice a fraud: .d.
In such c6se, a court of equity looks through the disguises which
cover the transaction, and charges the legal estate with a trust, which
while it cannot be enforced by the fraudulent donee, may be by those
who, in good faith, deal'with him as possessed of authority to make the
contract of sale :- Id.
AMENDMENT. See Judgment.
Joining Causes of Aciion-Action to Recover Land-Statute of-Lim-
itation-.fistake - Correction.-The court cannot, except by consent,
allow an amendment which changes the pleadings so as to make it sub-
stantially a new action, but an amendment which only adds to the
original cause of action is not of this nature, and may be allowed: Ely
v. Early, 94 N. C.
In an action to recover land, the court mayallow an amendment so as
to set up a mistake in a deed : Id.
An action to recover the possession of land, and to correct a mutual
mistake in a deed for the same land, executed by the plaintiff to the
defendant, constitute but one cause of action : Id.
Where a distinct cause of action is allowed to be inserted in a com-
plaint, by amendment, it is tantamount to bringing a new action, and
the statute of limitation runs to the time when the amendment is
allowed; but this rule does not apply when the new matter allowed by
the amendment constitutes a part of the original cause of action : Id.
So where, in an action to recover land, the court allowed the plaintiff
to amend, so as to set up a mutual mistake in a deed; the statute only
runs against the relief demanded by the amended complaint to the time
when the action was commenced: Id.
A court will only correct a mistake in a deed or other written instru-
ment, upon clear, strong and convincing proof, and it is error in the
.court to charge the jury that the plaintiff is entitled to have the issue
found in his favor upon a mere preponderance of evidence : Id.
In such casel, if the court should be of opinion that, in no reasonable
view of the evidence, is it sufficient to warrant a verdict establishing the
mistake, a verdict should be directed for 
the defendant : Id.
In the trial by a jury of issues arising in equitable matters, the rules
of equity should be followed as far as possible: .d.
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Tssues of fact, as distinguished from questions of fact, in equitable as
well as legal actions, must be tried by a jury; but this does not author-
ize the finding of such issues on less evidence than a chancellor would
find them: Id.
ASSIGNMENT.
For B, aefit of Creditors-Reservation in.-The reservation in a deed
for the benefit of creditors, of a reasonable fee for the preparation of the
deed, is such a preference as is forbidden by the insolvent act: Wofs-.
heimer v. .Rivinus, 64 Md.
ATTACHMENT. See Husband and Wife.
ATTORNEY. See Bills and.Notes; Exemption.
BANK.
Depositor -Pass-book-Examination of with Returned Touchers.-
A depositor in a bank whose pass-book is written up from time to time,
and the checks paid returned to him, is bound to examine the account
within a reasonable time and report to the bank any errors or omissions.
His silence is an admission that the entries are correct: Leather Manu-
facturers' Bank v. Morgan, S. 0. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
Where altered checks have been paid, if the bank's officers, by proper
care and skill, could have detected the forgeries, it cannot receive a
credit for the amount of these checks, even if the depositor omitted all
examination of his account: Id.
The required examination of the account can be made for the depositor
by a competent clerk ; but if the agent who examine; the account is the
one who committed the forgeries, the principal must at least show that
he exercised reasonable diligence in supervising the conduct of the
agent: Id.
BILLS AND NOTES.
BonO fide Purchaser-Notice-Attorney.-If the endorsee of a nego-
tiable instrument before its maturity, knew, or if such facts came to his
knowledge, which, if inquired into, would have informed him of an
equity of the maker, he takes the instrument cum onere : Hulbert v.
Douglass, 94 N. 0.
Where a negotiable note is secured by a mortgage, the fact that one-
half the land has been released, is some evidence to charge a purchaser
of the note before maturity with notice that there has been a partial
payment on the note i Id.
If anything appears to a party calculated to attract attention or stinmu-
late inquiry, the person is affected with knowledge of all that the
inquiry would have disclosed : d.
Notice to an attorney of any matter relating to the business in which
he is engaged for his client, is notice to the client : 17.
Where an attorney sold a note to a person who was occasionally his
client, and such attorney, acting for the purchaer, iuvestigated the title
to the land on which the note was sv-ured by a mortgafe, and was after-
wards employed by the purchaser to bring suit on, and collect the note:
It was held, to be some evidence that the attorney was acting for the
purchaser in the sale of the note: Id.
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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.-
Statute defining .Adulleration.-A statute forbidding and punishing
the sale of adulterated milk provided : "In all prosecutions under this
act, if the milk shall be shown upon analysis to contain more than 88
per cent. of watery fluids or to contain less than 12 per cent. of milk
solids, or less than 2J per cent. of milk fats, it shall be deemed for the
purpose of this act to be adulterated" Held, that the provisions were
constitutional : State v. Groves, 15 R. I.
Habeas CoGlyUs-Power of United States Courts to Discharge on.-A
Circuit Court of the United States has jurisdiction on habeas corpus to
discharge from custody a person restrained of his liberty, in violation of
the Constitution of the United States, although he is held under the
authority of a state: E-zparte Royall, S. C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
But where a person is in custody, under process from a state court of
original jurisdiction, for an alleged offence against the laws of such state
and it is claimed that he is restrained of his liberty in violation of the
Constitution of the United States, the Circuit Court has a discretion
whether it will discharge him upon habeas corpus, in advance of his
trial in the court in which he is indicted; "that discretion, however, to
be subordinated to any special circumstances requiring immediate action.
When the state court shall have finally acted upon the case, the Circuit
Court has still a discretion whether, under all the circumstances, the
accused, if convicted, shall be put to his writ of error from the highest
court of the state, or whether it will proceed, by writ of habeas corpus,
summarily to determine whether the petitioner is restrained of his liberty
in violation of the Constitution of the United States: Id.
CONTRACT. See Public Policy.
Consideration-Forbearance to Sue.-A. having a bona fide claim
against C. placed it in the hands of an attorney for collection, who
exhibited it both to C. and to B., his father, and informed them of the
consequences of the suit which he was instructed to institute. After
this information, B. obtained a bill of sale from his son of all his pro-
perty, and upon being told by A. that "he was going to send the
sheriff up that day; that he was not going to stop for that bill of
sale, it was all a fraud," he replied, "you keep quiet and you will get
your money ; I guess I am worth it." A. relying on the promise of B.,
left him, and called immediately to his attorney's and stopped further
proceedings: Held, that the forbearance to sue constituted a sufficient
consideration for the promise of B., and A. was entitled to recover in an
action against B. : Bowen v. Tipton, 64 Md.
CORPORATION. See Negligence; Tax.
Purchase of Stock of another Company- Use of.-While one railroad
company may have the right to acquire the stock of another company, it
has no right to use its controlling influence, thus acquired, with the
directors of the latter company, so as to sacrifice the initerest of that com-
pany: State v. Brown, 64 Md.
Charters-Power to Convey Land- Ultra Vires.-Where the charter
of a corporation.authorizes it to purchase land for some specified purpose
in the absence of evidence, it will be presumed that any land purchased
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by it, was accepted for the purposes authorized by the charter: Mallet
v. Simpson, 94 N. C.
Where the charter of a railroad company authorized it to purchase
land for the purpose of procuring stone and other material necessary for
the construction of the road, or fbr effecting transportation thereon. It
was held, dat the charter authorized the purchase of land for the pur-
pose of getting cross-ties and fire wood : Id.
At common law, in the absence of any provision in the charter, a cor-
poration has the power to acquire and hold real estate in fee. The
stautes of mortmain have never been adopted in this state : Id.
Even if a corporation is forbidden by its charter to hold or take a title
to real estate, a conveyance of land to it is not void. It is valid until
vacated by 'a direct proceeding by the sovereign, instituted for that pur-
pose: Id.
COSTS. See Will.
CRIMINAL LAW.
Extradition-Affidavit-Babeas Corpus.-It is immaterial whether
the warrant of the governor of this state for the arrest of the fugitive
from justice from another state is based on an original affidavit or a copy
thereof, when either one presented to the resident governor is certified
to the governor of the state where the crime was committed as being
authentic: Kurtz v. The State, 21 or 22 Fla.
The fugitive from justice cannot on habeas corpus impeach the
validity of the affidavit upon which the requisition was founded, if it
distinctly charge the commission of a crime: Id.
Bvidence- Threats -.Reputation.-Where there is no doubt but that
the prisoner began the encounter resulting in death, previous threats made
by the deceased, of serious bodily harm to, or against the life of the pris-
oner are not admissible in evidence, though they have been communi-
cated to the prisoner, there being no evidence of any demonstration upon
the part of the deceased made at the time of the killing and apparently
indicating an immediate intention of executing the threats: Bond v.
The State. 21 or 22 Fla.
Evidence of the reputation of the deceased as a violent, quarrelsome
and dangerous man in the community where he lives, is not admissible
when the prisoner is the assailant, and the killing takes place under cir-
cumstances that can afford him no reasonable ground to- believe himself
in danger of serious bodily harm: Id.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See Fraud.
Sale--Retention of Possession-Administrator-Right to Attack
Fraudulent Sale.-The retention of personal property by the vendor
after a sale isyrimafacie evidence of fraud, and the evidence to rebut
such presumption is an explanation of the retention by showing that it is
inconsistent with the deed, or is unavoidable, or is temporaryor for the
reasonable convenience of the vendee: Holliday v. acKinne, 21 or 22 Fla.
Creditors of an intestate have their right to question the fraudulent
transactions of their debtor by proper proceedings in the courts : Id.
The better rule is not to permit the representative of an estate to ques-
tion such transactions for the benefit of creditors: 1d.
DEED. See Husband and We.
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EQUITY. See Agent; Amendment; Fraud.
Marshalling Assets-Lien. on two Funds-Homestead.-Where one
creditor is secured by a lien upon two funds, and another by a lien upon
only one of them, the former will be compelled to exhaust the subject
of his exclusive lien before he can resort to the other: Pole v. Harns,
94 N. 0.
The equity to have the securities embraced in a trust for the benefit
of creditors of different classes, marshalled and appropriated in exonera-
tion of the liens of the less preferred class, is an equity against the
debtor, and not against the doubly secured creditor : Id.
The right of the debtor to a homestead is superior to that of all cred-
itors except so far as it may be impaired by the voluntary act of the
claimant: Id.
ESTOPPEL. See Mortgage.
EVIDENCE. See Criminal Law; Insurance; 'Will.
Suppression. of-Secondary Proofi-Where it is shown that evidence of
the indebtedness of a party to the estate of a decedent, has been suppressed
or destroyed by the debtor, or some one acting in his interest, such
indebtedness may be established by testimony, which, under ordinary
circumstances, would be regarded as too vague and indefinite : Love v.
Dilley, 64 Md.
imPeaching own Witnss.-A party cannot impeach his own witness
by proof through other witnesses of contradictory statements unless the
witness is one whom the law obliges the party to call : .ildreth v. Aldrich,
15 R. I.
A party disappointed in his witness may, to refresh the witness'
recollection, ask him if he has not made cgntradictory statements, but
cannot prove such statements by other witnesses: Id.
Explanation of Telegram by Parol.-Where the question is as to the
authoritygiven by a telegram, the party to it sued, should not be per-
mitted to testify what his intention was in sending it. Such intention,
in so far as the authority conferred is concerned, is to be derived from
the telegram and the entire contract between the parties . Aeinhardt v.
Mode, 21 or 22 Fla.
Where telegrams do not contain the entire contract, the other parts
of it may be proved by verbal testimony, or by other writings, or by
both, as in other cases where the entire contract has. not been reduced
to writing: Id.
Burnt Records-Recitals in Deeds.-Where records have been burned
or destroyed, the entries in the bound volumes containing the minutes
of the court are admissible in evidence to establish the regularity of the
proceedings: Hare v. Bolloman, 94 N. C.
Where land has been sold under a decree of court, and the records
have been destroyed, the recitals in the deeds are evidence of the regu-
larity of the proceedings : Id.
EXECUTION. See Exemption.
EXEMPTION. See Tax.
Tools-Lawyers' Books.-A statute exempting from attachment the
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necessary working tools of a debtor, not exceeding in value $200, covers
only tools used in manual labor, and does not cover a lawyer's law books:
Petition of Church, 15 R. 1.
Execution-A lotment-ilfortgqage.-A debtor is entitled to have his
personal pr, lerty exemption ascertained up to and immediately before
the sale: State v. .Harper, 94 N. 0.
After an execution has been returned with the allotment of the per-
sonal property exemption, it becomes an estoppel, but as long as the pro-
cess remains in the officer's hands, such allotment is in fieri, and may be
corrected : Id.
If property belonging to the judgment debtor has been omitted by the
appraisers, they have the power to correct the allotment : Id.
While an unregistered mortgage is not valid as to third parties, yet
the lack of registration cannot subject to sale under execution, property
which would be exempt if there were no mortgages : Id.
Burton v. Spiers, 87 N. 0. 87 ; Duvall v. Rollins, 68 Id. 230 ; Orum-
men v. Bennett, Id. 494, cited and approved: Id.
EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR. See Debtor and Creditor; Insur-
ance; Judgment.
FRAUD. See Debtor and Creditor.
M-audulent Conveyance-Evdence of Fraudulent Intent-Burden of
Proof.-No appeal lies from an order of a court of equity dismissing a
petition for a rehearing: Zimmer v. Miller, 64 Mid.
In order to justify the annulment of a deed as void under the statute
of 13 Eliz., chap. 5, because made with intent to delay, hinder, or
defraud the creditors of the grantor, it is necessary to prove a fraudu-
lent intent: d.
The intent with which a grantor executes a deed, must be gathered
from the deed itself, and from his acts and the surrounding circum-
stances. And when those circumstances are of such a character, as to
lead to the inference that there has been a fraudulent intent, the onus
of disproving fraud rests on the parties to the transaction: Id.
HUSBAND AND WIFE.
Attachment-Marridd Woman as Garnishee-Default-An attach-
meat was laid in the hands of a married woman as garnishee, returnable
before a magistrate. She failed to appear, and a judgment of condemna-
tion was rendered against her for the amount of the debt, $63.76, with
interest and costs. Between the time the attachment was laid and the
judgment was rendered, the husband of the garnishee died. On a bill
filed to restrain the execution of the judgment, it was hel( that having
failed to appear, as it was her duty to do, in person, or by agent or at-
torney, and avail herself of any defence which she might have, whether of
coverture or otherwise, she had no standing in a court of equity to obtain
relief against a judgment rendered against her by her own default, in
the absence of clear proof of fraud or surprise, unmixed with negligence
or fault on her part: Ahern v. Fink, 64 Md.
Deed by Married Woman-Defective Execution and Acknowledgment
-Correction of after Suit Brought.-An instrument in writing made
by a married woman purporting to be a deed conveying real estate, but
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without a seal, not acknowledged by her as required by statute, and in
which her husband did not join, is -a nullity: Carn v. .aisley, 21 or 22
Fla.
Such paper acquires no validity from the execution of a paper by the
husband afterwards purporting to ratify said deed of the wile: Id.
A private examination of the wife before the proper officer is an indis-
pensable requisite to the conveyance of her real estate. A deed of land
belonging to a married woman, but not acknowledged by her until after
suit commenced by her grantee for the recovery of the land described
therein, cannot be introduced in evidence in said suit: Id.
The plaintiff cannot avail himself of a title acquired or which did not
subsist in him until after he commenced suit: Id.
INSURANCE.
Parol Evidence to vary Policy-Assignment-Parties.-Parol evi-
dence is incompetent to' vary, explain or contradict a written instrument.
So where an'insurance 'company contracted in writing to pay a sum of
money to the personal representative of the insured, parol evidence is
not admissible to show that it was intended that the sum should be paid
to certain of his children : Elliott v. Whedbee, 94 N. C.
Where the by-law of an insurance company allowed the holder of a
policy to designate the beneficiaries, by endorsing on the back of the
policy the names of such beneficiaries, which endorsement was to be
signed and witnessed: It was held, that a designation could not bemade
by the insured, by merely writing the names of the beneficiaries in the
blank prepared on the policies for that purpose, but without signing it:
Id.
Where a policy of insurance is payable to the personal representative
of the deceased, his administrator may maintain an action for the
money, against some of the next of kin who have received it: Id.
Where, in such case, the amount of the policy has been paid to some
of the next of kin of the insured, and the administrator sues them to
recover the amount, if the estate is solvent, and the money is not needed
for the payment of debts, the defendants are entitled to retain their dis-
tributive shares, and the administrator can only recover the excess: Id.
INTOXICATING LIQUOR.
IllegaZ keeping for Sale.-A., duly licensed to sell liquors in Provi-
dence, sent liquors in bulk to B., in Hopkinton, where no licenses were
granted, with the agreement that they should remain the property of A.,
but that B. might draw ten gallons at a time as he wished, paying there-
for when drawn: Held, that A. was illegally keeping for sale and selling
liquor in Hopkinton, and that the liquors were properly seized and were
forfeited to the state: In re Liquors of Young, 15 R. I.
JUDGMENT.
Amendment of.-The rule is settled that a judgment rendered at one
term, may be amended at a subsequent term, nunc pro tunc, when from
an inspection of the record in the cause, it is apparent that the proposed
amendment would have been a part of the original judgment,'or that
the original judgment would have been in accordance therewith, had it
not have'been fbr the inadvertence of the court or an error or omission
of the clerk. Adams v. .Regua, 21 or 22 Fla.
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When a suit is brought against an administrator of an estate, and
judgment rendered adding only after his name "administrator of estate
of J. S. Adams," and the whole record shows that the suit was based
on a claim or demand against the deceased person of whose estate the
defendant is administrator, the court will, on motion, at a subsequent
term, permit the record to be amended so as to show that the defendant
was sued, and judgment rendered against him "as administrator of
J. S. Adams, deceased :" Id.
LEGACY. See Set-off.
LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF. See Amendment.
MANDAMUS.
Return to-Affidavit-Illegal Purpose.-The allegations of a return
or an answer to an alternative writ of mandamus, should be stated posi-
tively, and not upon information and belief: State v. County Com., 21
or 22 Fla.
The rules requiring pleas to be sworn to, does not restrict a defendant
to pleading matter of defence which are within his personal knowledge.
The affidavit is required as an evidence of the pleader's good faith in
setting up the defence : Id.
A mandamus will not issue to enable a person to effect an illegal pur-
pose, e. g., to compel the county commissioners to issue a permit to sell
liquors under chapter 3416, to one whose purpose is to transfer the same,
and a license to be issued by the collector of revenue, to another who
has not complied with.such statute; and to thereby enable him to carry
on the business of a liquor dealer unlawfully : Id.
MISTAKE. See Amendment.
MORTGAGE.
Absence of Seal-Notice-Demurrer-Estoppel.-A. made a loan of
money to B., and received B.'s note, accompanied by a paper signed by
B. and his wife, acknowledged and recorded, and which would have
been a valid mortgage had it been sealed. 0. attached B.'s interest in
the realty described in the paper, whereupon A. filed a bill in equity
against B. and his wife, and C., charging accident and mistake. as the
cause of the paper not being sealed ; actual notice of the paper on the
part of G., and praying that the paper might be reformed by affixing
seals. C. demurred to the bill ; held, that the demurrer must be over-
ruled : Bullock v. Wldpp, 15 R. I.
A man cannot allow another to part with money on the faith of a con-
veyance, and then taking advantage of some defect known to himself,
claim to have acquired by a subsequent conveyance, a title better in
equity than that obtained by such other: Id.
Partnershf -Execution by one Member of Firm-Reservation of right
of Mortgagees to sell Property without accounting.-An instrument exe-
cuted by one member of a partnership, in the firm name, and legally bind-
ing upon the partnership and entitled to be recorded under the registry
statutes of Florida, may be admitted to record upon the acknowledg-
ment of the partner who executed it: HcCoy v. Boley, 21 or 22 Fla.
A mortgage duly recorded is not void as between the parties to it, or
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as to a third person, whose claim is not based on a valuable considera-
tion, from the fact that it permits the mortgagor to sell personal property
covered by it without accounting to the mortgagee for the proceeds : Id
Vague Description-Entire Crop.-The sale or mortgage of a crop to
be planted, as well as one planted and in process of cultivation, is valid
-provided the place where the crop is to be produced is designated with
certainty sufficient to identify it. It seems, parol testimony is compe-
tent to fit the description to the property, and show the agreement of the
parties: Rountree v. Britt, 94 N. 0.
A mortgage conveying "1 my entire crop of every description," is too
vague to pass any title to the property mentioned : Id.
NEGzIGENCE.
Railroad- 2respass- Child-- Corporation-Charter-Demurrer.-A
young child strayed from its home on to a railroad track, crossed the
track and fell into an adjoining trench. The track was not fenced on
the trench side. In an action against the railroad company for dam-
ages, the plaintiff child claimed that its fall was caused by the company's
negligence in not fencing the track on the side of the trench; held, on
demurrer to the declaration, that the company was as to the plaintiff un-
der no obligation so to fence its tracks that the plaintiff could not get
from them on to the adjoining land. Red, further, that the action could
not be maintained: Aforrisey v. Providence & Worcester Rd. Co., 15
R.I.
On demurrer to a declaration against a corporation, the charter of the
corporation is not before the court: Id.
Contributory Neyligence- When a Question of Law for the Court-
Ordinarily the question of contributory negligence is a question of
fact for a jury, under instructions from the court, but when there is no
contradiction in the evidence, and the facts are undisputed, and the con-
clusion and inference to be drawn from it, is indisputable, involving only
a common instinct of mankind-self-preservation-it becomes a ques-
tion of law: Id.
When a person voluntarily walks on and along the track of a railroad
laid in a public thoroughfare, which he knew was used as a switch-yard
on which locomotives were passing to and fro, night and day, where the
walking on either side of said track was as good as on the track, and in
doing so is run over by a passing train and killed, he has, by the failure
to exercise ordinary care and prudence, directly contributed to his own
misfortune, and his representative cannot recover from the company
using said track, damages therefor: Id.
NOTICE. See Bills and Notes.
PARTNERSHI p. See Mortgage.
PAYMENT.
When Vountary-Protest-Taxes.-An action will not lie to recover
the amount of taxes illegally assessed and voluntarily paid: Dunnell Afg.
Co. v. Newell, 15 R. I.
A tax is not paid under compulsion merely because the collector holds
a warrant to collect it by levy or distress, but if paid under protest a tax
illegally assessed may be recovered: d.
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PUBLIC POLICY.
Wager-Stakeholder-Recovery of Money Deposted.-A. deposited
with a stakeholder the amount of his wager on a match at pool be-
tween C. and D. While the games were playing, but after it was
clear that A. would lose, A. denounced the match to the stakeholder as
a fraud, and notified the stakeholder not to pay the money over. At the
close of the match the stakeholder paid over the amount to the winner
of the wager; whereupon A. sued the stakeholder for his deposit: Held,
that A. should recover: Afc Grath v. Kennedy, 15 R. I.
RAItROAD. See Negligence.
RECEIVERS.
Compensation-Allowance of-ow Payabk.-The rule for compen-
sating receivers is not of the same invariable character as that governing
in the case of trustees ; but the allowance to receivers of insolvent cor-
porations or private partnerships, in all cases not attended with peculiar
circumstances requiring an augmentation should be regulated by analogy,
as near as possible, to the rate of commissions allowed to guardians and
trustees for the performance of like or kindred services. And whatever
rate of compensation under this rule may be allowed, the order making
the allowance should be definite, that it may not be doubtful upon what
basis or for what services the particular allowance is made: Tome v. King,
64 Md.
Where receivers are appointed solely at the instance and for the benefit
of the second mortgage bondholders, and the trustees who sold the pro-
perty were appointed fo sell exclusively for the same parties, and not for
the benefit of the first mortgage bondholders, upon no principle of justice
or reason, can the first mortgage bondholders be assessed to pay the com-
missions and other expenses allowed, or any part of them, to such
receivers and trustees : Id.
If the fund in court be not sufficient to afford adequate compensation
and indemnity to the receivers, the parties at whose instance they were
put upon the property, should be required to provide the means of pay-
ment: Id.
REMOVAL OF CAUSES.
The mere filing a petition for the removal of a suit that is not remov-
able does not work a transfer. To accomplish this, the suit must be one
that may be removed, and the petition must show a right in the peti-
tioner to demand the removal: Stone v. State of South Carolina, S. C.
U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
If the state court proceeds after a petition for removal, it does so at
the risk of having its final judgment reversed, if the record on its face
shows that when the petition was filed, that court ought to have given up
its jurisdiction : Id.
There is no statute which authorizes the removal of a suit between a
state and citizens on account of citizenship, for a state cannot, in the
nature of things, be a citizenof any state: Id.
Where the money sued for was received by the defendants as partners,
and they are liable jointly for its payment, if they are liable at all, such
a case is not removable unless all the partners on one side of the contro-
versy unite in the petition for removal: Id.
ABSTRACTS OF RECENT DECISIONS.
Separate Controversy- Creditor's Bill.-A bill filed by a judgment-
creditor to marshal liens and obtain a sale of debtor's property free of
encumbrance to pay his judgment after satisfying.all prior claims, and
in the meantime to have a receiver appointed, raises but a single cause
of action which is indivisible. Though each of the lien-holders may
have a separate defence, this does not create "separate controversies"
within the meaning of the removal act: Fidelity Co. v. Huntingdon, S.
C. U. S., Oct. Term 1885.
Ejectment against a Tmnant-IAdmission of Landlord with same
Citizenship as Plaintiff as Defendant.-An action of ejectment was
brought in a court of Missouri, by citizens of Pennsylvania, against a
citizen of Missouri, and removed to the United States Circuit Court of
the proper district upon the petition of the plaintiffs. Afterwards the
landlords of the original defendant, who were of the same citizenship as
the plaintiffs were let in as defendants: Held, that the cause was there-
upon impropierly remanded to the state court: Phe4ps v. Oaks, S. C. U.
S. Oct. Term 1885.
STATUTE.
Repealing Clause in Unconstitutional Statute.-A repealing clause in
an unconstitutional statute, declaring that "all laws and parts of laws in
conflict with this act, be and the same are hereby repealed," does not
affect the previous laws.: Wilhe v. Barnes, 24 or 22 Fla.
WILL.
Latent Ambiguity-Parol Evidence--Action in ejeetment to recover
Jot of land in Washington, D. C. The plaintiff claimed title under
Henry Walker, devisee of James Walker. The latter by his will made
specific devises of real estate in the city of Washington, to four different
persons, designating each property devised, by reference to squares and
lots as numbered on a recorded plat or survey of the city. This was
followed by a devise of the balance of his real estate "believed to be
and to consist in" various other lots designated in like manner, but (lot
No. three in square four huudred and six, hereinafter referred to,-was
not mentioned) one of the specific devises was "to my brother, Henry
Walker, forever, lot numbered six, in square four hundred and three,
together with the improvements thereon erected, and appurtenances
thereto belonging." Parol evidence was offered on behalf of plaintiff
to show that the testator did not own lot number six, in square four hun-
dred and three, but did own lot number three in square number four
hundred and six, that the former had no improvements on it at all, while
on the latter there was a dwelling-house; this, for the purpose of
explaining an alleged latent ambiguity in the devise to Henry Walker, so
as to control the description of the lot therein contained, and make it
apply to lot three in square number four hundred and six. The court
below held the evidence insufficient: held, reversing the judgment
of the court below, that the evidence taken in connebtion with the whole
tenor of the will raises a latent ambiguity, and amounts to demonstration,
as to which lot was in the testator's mind. Justices WooD, MArTHEWS,
GRAY and BLATOHFORD dissent: Patch v. White, S. C., U. S., Oct.
Term, 1885. -
